Sunday, December 30, 2007

dow13366, sp 13300
naz2674, sp 2650
spx1478, Rs 1455, sp 1485


Saturday, December 29, 2007

Monday, December 24, 2007

Sunday, December 23, 2007

Friday, December 21, 2007

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Friday, November 23, 2007

Asti weekly chart
ETFC showed a lot of activities in premarket with about 10% price gain.
Monitored it after open, but missed the first break out, and then became hesitated in the 2nd breakout.
Then the price came down and I was thinking to short it. However, it tested the support around 4.95 and turned up, bot at the 1st consolidation, out in a price breakdown(looks like a shake out).

Thursday, November 22, 2007


Dow Theory says sell
Commentary: All three Dow Theory newsletters I follow are now bearish
By Mark Hulbert, MarketWatch

Last Update: 4:35 PM ET Nov 21, 2007Print E-mail Subscribe to RSS Disable Live Quotes
ANNANDALE, Va. (MarketWatch) -- With the Dow Jones Industrial Average's finish on Wednesday below its August lows, the three Dow Theory newsletters I track are solidly in the bearish camp.

The Dow Theory, for those not familiar with it, traces to a series of editorials that appeared over the first three decades of the last century in The Wall Street Journal. Those editorials were written by William Peter Hamilton, then the editor of that newspaper, on the basis of conversations he had with Charles Dow, the founder of Dow Jones & Co., the newspaper's publisher. (Dow Jones is the owner of MarketWatch, the publisher of this column.)
Hamilton's editorials leave lots of room for followers to argue over the more esoteric points of the theory. But the general outlines are clear enough of what is required to trigger a Dow Theory sell signal:

1. Both the Dow Jones Industrials Average ($INDU 12,799.04, -211.10, -1.6%) and the Dow Jones Transportation Average ($TRAN 4,366.60, -58.85, -1.3%) must undergo a significant correction from joint new highs.

2. In their subsequent rally attempt following that correction, either one or both of the averages fail to rise above their precorrection highs.

3. Both averages must then drop below their respective correction lows.

Step No. 1 began this past July, by the correction that began from that month's highs. Step No. 2 was satisfied during the rally that began from the market's mid-August lows, in which the Dow Jones Transportation Average failed to surpass its precorrection high.

With the DJIA's close on Wednesday below its August lows, Step No. 3 is now satisfied too, since the DJTA earlier this month had already closed below its August lows.

Why should you care about the Dow Theory?

One reason is that many investors pay close attention to it. I suspect that was one of the reasons that the DJIA seesawed all day Wednesday above and below its August closing low of 12,846. In fact, it wasn't until the final few minutes of trading that it became clear that it would close below that level, and thereby trigger a Dow Theory sell signal.

Why should you care about the Dow Theory? One reason is that many investors pay close attention to it.

The Dow Theory's popularity should trigger additional selling when investors currently on vacation return from their Thanksgiving holidays, either on Friday, or more likely this coming Monday.

Another reason to pay attention to the Dow Theory: Its long-term track record is good. Confirmation comes from none other than the Ivory Tower, which traditionally has pooh-poohed the notion that the stock market could be timed.

Consider a study conducted in the mid-1990s by three finance professors -- Stephen J. Brown of New York University, William Goetzmann of Yale University and Alok Kumar of the University of Texas at Austin. They fed Hamilton's market-timing editorials from the early decades of the last century into neural networks, a type of artificial intelligence software that can be "trained" to detect patterns.

Upon testing this neural network version of the Dow Theory over the nearly 70-year period from 1930 to the end of 1997, they found that it beat a buy-and-hold by an annual average of 4.4 percentage points per year. Their study appeared in the August 1998 Journal of Finance.

Mark Hulbert is the founder of Hulbert Financial Digest in Annandale, Va. He has been tracking the advice of more than 160 financial newsletters since 1980.


Link

Sunday, November 18, 2007

weekly chart on spwr-nyx-fwlt-wynn



weekly chart fslr-isrg-drys-mos




weekly chart on ma-bidu-amzn-ice




Naz prospective and the leading stocks






Friday, November 16, 2007





Classic OE day maximum pain rally
notes:1.should wait for market stablizing before enter position. the best entry point is 2nd green bar after W bottom.
2. down panic selling has 5 waves.
3. Patterns: v/W bottom, inverse head shoulder, rising bullis wedge,5 waves,neckline resistance

Wednesday, November 14, 2007


CarrryTrade

After comparing the SPX and JYN, you have to agree that Japaness Yen carry trade is the underlying force of the market selling off this year!

Sunday, November 11, 2007

dow 13043, 13000-12650(trendline) -3.0%
12900(weekly trendline) -1.1%
naz 2628, 2580(MA200) -1.8%,
2490(weekly trendline) -5.3%
spx 1454, 1450-1420(trendline), -2.3%
1410(weekly trendline), -3%

rimm MA50 105
aapl MA50 161

ER of the week

bx noon
wx amc
shld noon

exm amc
hd bmo
ioc amc
xfml amc
snda noon

amat noon
dsx bmo
mt bmo
sina amc

a amc
ej noon
fcsx noon
stp bmo
gmo noon

bx,wx,shld,exm,hd,ioc,xfml,snda,amat,dsx,mt
sina,a,ej,fcsx,stp,gmo
The ‘Carry Trade’ and the Current Financial Turmoil

By Michael MH Lim Dominance of Finance Capitalism

THE age of finance capitalism has eclipsed the age of productive capitalism. The amount of financial assets held worldwide and the volume of financial transactions, from currency trades to swaps to equities and bonds etc., dwarf the traditional measures of national capital. According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the ratio of financial assets to annual world output tripled from 110% in 1980 to 316% in 2005. Even more astounding is the volume of financial transactions: the notional outstanding value of interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and interest rate options reached $286 trillion (about six times the global gross product, and up 82 times from a mere $3.5 trillion in 1990). Today currency rates are determined more by speculative trading than by the underlying movement of goods and services.

Whilst the explosion of financial assets and transactions has brought benefits to mainly the big players in the markets (last year, it was reported that three hedge fund managers dabbling in the sub-prime mortgage market each took home over $1 billion in pay and bonus), with some trickle-down effects to the middle class, it has wrought tremendous risks and instability on the financial system. Today the financial markets are reeling from the risk fall-out from different types of financial instruments and derivatives, two of which are the ‘carry trade’, and the sub-prime mortgage loans which are linked to collateralised debt obligations.

The deregulation and liberalisation of the financial system, starting from the US and foisted on other countries, the technological revolution with computerisation, and the loose monetary policies of the central banks, most notably in the US and Japan, have created huge amounts of liquidity in the world financial system. These have encouraged the introduction of all kinds of new financial instruments, and created even more interdependence between financial markets. Money borrowed in one currency can easily be transferred or invested in any currency or instrument at an instant and in billions. (The size of the foreign currency markets is so huge that currency traders invent their own language; for them $1 represents $1 million, and 1 yard denotes $1 billion.)

The ‘Carry Trade’

Imagine you can borrow money using your credit card at zero interest and then invest that money in fixed deposit and earn interest. When the credit card’s zero-rate period matures, you pay back the loan or, better still, roll it over on to a new card! That was known as ‘stoozing’ and was very popular among Americans at one time until the credit card issuers started charging a balance transfer fee.

Bankers and financial speculators do the same thing when they borrow money in one currency with low or zero interest rate (as was the case with the yen a few years back), then invest the funds in another currency or instrument with higher yields, and earn a spread (i.e. the difference in the yields). Except this practice has a more respectable-sounding name: it is known as the ‘carry trade’ in financial circles; and it is more risky because it carries with it currency risks. Any profit made from the interest rate differential can easily be wiped out if the yen appreciates significantly. This risk is further amplified if the transaction is leveraged, as is mostly the case.

In the simplest case, speculators and investors borrow yen at 0.5% and invest in US treasuries at 5%, earning a spread of 4.5%. In theory, this is not supposed to happen as the difference in interest rate between the two currencies is equal to the difference between the spot and forward rates of the two currencies. In other words, the interest rate differential is theoretically offset by the appreciation of the yen over the dollar over the same period. Perversely, however, borrowing the yen puts downward pressure on the yen value. Furthermore, a confluence of factors in Japan, including a high savings rate and the government’s policy to reflate the economy out of recession and deflation through cheap exports, result in an undervalued yen and a low interest rate environment. The yen has traditionally been undervalued, and the relative stability of the interest rate spread between the yen and other currencies has allowed investors to enjoy the ride from the carry trade for a long time. Japanese yen is reputed to be the most undervalued currency, even more than the renminbi. It is estimated that the yen is 40% undervalued against the euro.

To enhance their yield, investors could invest in bonds, equities, real estate, sub-prime mortgage loans or any other instruments. In short, the carry trade has become a major source of low-cost funds for the world, with money flowing into everything from Wall Street stocks, to main-street home mortgages, to emerging-market stocks and bonds. The yen carry trade amplifies the already serious distortions in the global economy. Japanese excess liquidity is supporting asset inflation and bubbles across the world.

Players in the carry trade include individual Japanese who would rather invest in foreign bonds than in Japanese bank deposits; Japanese pension funds, insurance funds, and banks which do the same; and, of course, international hedge funds, banks and other speculators. Nobody knows for sure how big the market for the carry trade is. Estimates run from $350 billion, according to Japanese banks, to over $1 trillion (based on futures and options contracts in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). That is 10 times the size of Malaysia’s GDP.
Just imagine what will happen when this carry trade dries up. Like a tsunami, the drying of the carry trade will hit the financial markets, causing a massive liquidity crunch and a fall in worldwide financial asset prices.

History of the Carry Trade

The first wave of carry trade started in the late 1980s when financial speculators borrowed in yen and invested in European securities. This first phase ended in 1993 after the Japanese bubble collapsed, Japanese investors retreated home and the yen appreciated. The second round of carry trade began in the summer of 1995 and ended in late 1998 after Russia defaulted, the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund collapsed, and the Japanese government planned to recapitalise the distressed banking sector. The yen rose 15% against the dollar in a week.

The recent wave of the yen carry trade is built on the Japanese government’s policy of keeping its interest rate and currency low in order to export its way out of recession and deflation. It has continued until last week (10-17 August) when the yen jumped 10% caused by the default in sub-prime mortgages and the knock-on effects on equity markets worldwide.

Effects of the Carry Trade

Because many of the speculators used the funds to invest in overseas equities on a leveraged basis, when stock prices decline, they are forced to liquidate their equity positions to meet margin calls. This in turn causes the equity markets to tumble further. When the speculators and investors divest their foreign equities and securities and convert their dollars into yen, that sends the yen spiralling upwards. Hence, the investors are dealt a double whammy: not only have they lost on their equity investments, they now also lose from the yen currency appreciation.

Because of the scale of carry trades and the negative effect on liquidity, the consequences on world-wide financial instability are enormous. The problem with today’s financial system is that much of the trading is carried out by big-time players like international banks and hedge funds which have contrived highly complicated transactions that are opaque and where the risks are not well understood, let alone regulated. Many of the risks of these instruments have been packaged and repackaged, sold and resold to all types of investors, so that it is now difficult to figure out where the risks are located, and how to regulate and control them. While the risks have been diversified through packaging and parceling out, they have not been eliminated.

A corollary of this diversification is that we do not know where the risks reside. This is best illustrated in the current crisis of sub-prime mortgages. This problem surfaced recently with the collapse of two funds managed by Bear Stearns; this was followed by the suspension of three of BNP Paribas’ sub-prime mortgage funds. These prominent players probably just represent the tip of the iceberg. The Bangkok Post has revealed that even Thai banks, and no doubt many domestic banks in other emerging markets, looking for high-yielding assets, have speculated in these sub-prime mortgages. The 24 August CNBC news reported that the combined sub-prime mortgage holdings of the major banks in China were $11 billion. Where is the next revelation? The big question, therefore, is: where is the proverbial Waldo? Who will be the next to emerge naked? As Warren Buffett put it vividly, we do not know who is naked until the tide starts to recede.

When will the carry trade end? In a prescient article in the International Herald Tribune of 22 February 2007, the author wrote that while the 0.5% rate rise by the Bank of Japan would not halt the yen outflow, the carry trade could dry up from other external shocks. Sure enough, six months later, the chickens have come home to roost. The crisis of not only the sub-prime mortgages, but the whole housing bubble created in the super-low interest rate environment of the 1990s, have created ripple effects throughout the world financial markets. Falling stock, bond and real estate prices have caused speculators and investors to liquidate their financial holdings to buy and repay their yen borrowing, sending the yen higher and amplifying their losses.

Whilst this latest episode of the yen carry trade is not yet over, it is unlikely it will be the last until the structural conditions in Japan and the US make it unprofitable for investors and speculators to play the game. Meanwhile, the tidal waves created by finance capital are sweeping the ordinary guys on the street helplessly about like pebbles on the shore.

Michael Lim has a PhD in Economic and Social Development studies. He was a post-doctoral fellow at Duke University and Assistant Professor at Temple University. Subsequently he became an international and investment banker in various banks in New York, Singapore, Hong Kong, Jakarta and Manila. His recent positions included being Vice President at Credit Suisse First Boston, Director at Deutsche Bank and Senior Restructuring Specialist at the Asian Development Bank. Presently he is an independent researcher and scholar.

http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance110704.htm

Saturday, November 10, 2007

naz 2628, 2580(MA200) -1.8%,
2490(weekly trendline) -5.3%

dow 13043, 13000-12650(?,trendline) -3.0%
12900(weekly trendline) -1.1%

spx 1454, 1450-1420(trendline), -2.3%
1410(weekly trendline), -3%






Saturday, October 27, 2007

1. cf,schn,sohu
2. snp,ceo,cmc,cpo,gt,x,sirf,cea
3.ccj,crs,grmn,hurn,ma,sun,rig
4.agu,clf,cam,cry,cyno,xray,edo,xom,ftk,mro,mr,nmx,osk,tso,usu,vrsn,dsx
5. atro,cvx,nrg,nyx

cf,schn,sohu

snp,ceo,cmc,cpo,gt,x,sirf,cea

ccj,crs,grmn,hurn,ma,sun,rig

agu,clf,cam,cry,cyno,xray,edo,xom,ftk,mro

mr,nmx,osk,tso,usu,vrsn,dsx

atro,cvx,nrg,nyx

Monday, October 15, 2007

1. the best opportunity to purchase calls is at support from retracing, or after several days of horizontal consolidation after a big run, never jump in when it already had a huge run.

2. buy next month option, which will give you some leeway, if the stock doesn't move immediately. don't buy current month calls, unless you are 80% the stock is going to take off within 1-2 days.

3. for current month option, exit half if you have more than 100% profits, or the stock reaches price target.

4. for high iv strong stocks, buy stocks might be a good option.

5. for short term uncertainity, buy spreads (calendar, or vertical), if stock trades sideway or down, at resistance buy back the sold call, and let the other call run for profits.

6. diversify: a. sector diversify, choose the hottest sectors, like shipping, hightech, agricultural chemicals, iron-steel, copper, aluminum, oil, and chinese blue stocks. For each sector, choose 1-3 best players, and group them into a team for each period. this will reduce risks.

b. timely diversify, use current month, next month and leap call to hedge the volatility.

7. buy 1-2 calls each time for each stock. in order to reduce single large loss, avoid buying expensive calls (>5$).

8.check charts daily for price target and trend, be prepared for profits taking.

(to be continued)

Friday, October 12, 2007

ER
mon, c etn dna edu
teu, dal jnj pkx stx stld yhoo
wed, mo amr ebay ne nvec utx
thur,amd cal cy goog nue pfe rs sndk spwr unp
fri, cat hon slb

c,etn,dna,edu,dal,jnj,pkx,stx,stld,yhoo

mo,amr,ebay,ne,utx,amd,cal,cy,goog,nue

pfe,rs,sndk,spwr,unp,cat,hon,slb
短线炒作的精神
--仅献给年轻的和未来的高手们

by 亮劍華爾街
第一段 时间

有多少精英,皆在一夜暴富的驱使下,折戟沉沙!!!
  
第二段 亏损 仅献给无畏散户们

做交易,只想包赢不赔的美事,最后结局,一路套死!!!
  
第三段 节制 仅献给红眼输家们;

如果想死得更快点,只需亏损后,加码再赌,誓不罢休!!!
  
第四段 优势 仅献给平庸俗手们

无鱼偏下网,无刀偏屠龙,那是有病;春耕秋收,一招制敌,小孩都懂!
  
第五段 管理 仅献给业余炒家们

大起大落,终点回起点,不是刺激,是风险!惟有持续稳定获利才叫真谛!

==================

第一段:时间

要成为好的交易者,必须耐心接受时间给予你的磨练,如果不想在磨练中过早死去,那就先请你减小交易的规模,别下赔不起的注!时间不够,空谈枉然!! 

第二段:亏损

在市场最平常的事就是--亏损!你的每一笔交易,只要去做,都可能会遭受亏损,管她高手还是神仙,都一样。没办法,你要做的就是接受它,必须接受!这是做交易最起码和最重要的态度,不接受亏损的人,总有一次暴毙,不主动承担风险的人,市场的奴隶而已!追求完美,死不认错,侥幸求生,交易大忌也。不是指高手也要犯错呀,交易不要固执,低调什么的是指,每一次交易都是风险,回避不掉,要行动就得承担,承担的方法,就靠你这次交易的底线,而风险的底线,就是你将要实际付出的亏损,至于处理得好坏,与你运气和经验有关,但关键是要去执行,要把stop变成习惯。要习惯把帐户一部分钱做为试错的炮灰,每次都这样做,市场的刺痛,会让你逐渐专业而不浮躁,很简单吗?老调重谈!但你要想好好来从事交易,那么对待亏损的态度以及风险管理的理念一千遍也不多,因为,市场不是我们说了就算,而且,它混乱时,天也无奈。何况你也犯错不断,有心则乱,金钱美女置怀,几人可做到脸不变色心不跳?!凡人呀。

“亏损”这段讲2个方面:
  
一是接受亏损,因为市场无情,亏损是游戏的一部分。 (态度)
二是执行底线,因为生存需要,止损是活着退场的保证。(行动)

哪什么叫止损呢???
止损就是你只能容忍的损失,你只能赌到这个份上,再赌下去,就没把握,失控啦。至于市场是不是就会失控,不一定,也只有天知道怎样。什么价位止损好呢?任何价都可以!只要哪个价破了使你觉得不安全就是那个价,至于市场是不是就会不安全,不一定,也只有天知道怎样。止损效果嘛,跟经验和运气相关。其实止得好不好也没关系,长路漫漫,有得学纒top就不错啦,及格!论坛里的那些高手,他们不仅知道主力在干什么(吸货呀,拉呀,出呀,打压呀等) 而且也晓得市场会做什么,当然正确设个止损小菜一碟
要不要止损都无所谓,如果你不是老天爷,那随便设个价止损吧,只要你能到时坚决执行,就是高手啦,剩下的技巧问题,让亏损来教你吧,比这些人管用,真的!

关于止损问题
说不清楚的,但前提是必须符合你的操作个性,反正其精髓就是控制损失。仅此而已。
我个人是以资金来制定止损,对股价的处理,一般市道多以快收盘来决定,应该灵活的
我崇尚机械交易系统,个性化和艺术性,与纪律的结合,以及适应自己人性弱点的操作处理,都是交易的挑战和乐趣,每个人都要自己的生存方式,交易同样如此,坚持你自己.

第三段 节制

我不讲你也知道我要说些啥,但你不知道,市场最需要节制的--就是输家!败军之惨烈不过一轮轮自杀式冲锋,总以为这样孤注一掷地赌,压对一次,就解决了你所面临的一切问题,错啦!输红了眼的赌徒可以传奇翻盘,那是电影,现实中又有几个红眼赌徒生还??!!如果老输,你就不能停一停,歇一歇吗??!!

第四段 优势

交易者生存的基础,在于市场的不均衡,无论是时间的不均衡,还是波动空间的不均衡,它必然有概率上的偏差,认识市场,在于认识不均衡,利用偏差而动,只有在市场提供可交易的优势时,才能行动,换言之,当市场不提供赚钱机会时,哪怕掘土3千尺,也休想榨出一滴油!你有等待偏差的耐心吗?你有判断偏差的优势吗?你有利用偏差动手的绝招吗?好好回答自己吧!
市场机会永远无限,需要分清哪些机会是你能测?其中又有哪些是你最擅长把握?利用市场优势,集中自身优势,完成自己能做的事,很简单。
散户最大的优势是什么?资金是自己的
散户最大的缺点是什么?没耐心
散户最怕的市场是什么?怕没机会
散户最不怕的又是什么?不怕亏损
所以,当你把不利化为有利的时候,再加上一点点正确的方法,你就可以赚钱了,简单。

第五段 管理

拉瑞.威廉姆斯说过:
“直到你学会采用资金管理方法以前,你不过只是一位微不足道的小投机客而已”
  
对!!!
你能否管理自己的交易 ?
你能否管理自己的帐户 ?
你能否管理自己的习惯 ?
这就是业余与职业的区别!!!!!
什么叫职业?!无它,“稳定”二字!!!
  
怎样管理呢,又一门学问.

大部份人都能学得一技之长贡献社会并养家营生,也有极少数人会不务正业流连赌场,视博弈为赚钱良方。学有专长者如股市分析师、水电工人等,都是有益于他人。有时候水电工人倒是比分析师有用。早上起来读读分析师的报告并不能让您在当日交易获利,但中午来修花园喷水系统的水电工却能使它马上停止漏水。当夕阳斜,晚风飘时,想想看,到底谁比较有用?

一个短线交易者不该去当分析师,而要试着成为能修花园喷水系统的水电工,一动就能见效,也就是说,一交易,买或卖就要获利。同时他要认知自己是在赌场环境中的一个赌徒,因此短线交易者要学会一针见血之技,也要是个赌徒,好的赌徒,能算会算的赌徒。水电工与赌徒都要认识自己的一个限制,那就是想以此成为巨富,慢谈。要以此营生或时时赚些小利,蝇头也罢,倒可试试,但需知一些小秘密。

第一要,要快乐。你如果觉得短线交易不简单,很痛苦,就不要做。所谓短线交易最短者就是日交易,当日进当日出,不放过夜。长期持股长期伤脑筋,短线交易不过夜,晚上睡得安稳。因持股时间短,担心时间也短。当然,一两天或两三天的持股期也归类为短线交易。短线交易的目的在寻刺激找快乐,不成就这小目的就不要试.

第二要,要略懂技术分析,三分靠本事,七分靠感觉。重点在略懂两字,学太多懂太多,就可以去当正式技术分析师了,何需自做短线?学半天就可以学会修花园喷水系统,只要学一天技术分析就可做短线。那要学些什么呢?十分钟线图会画趋势线,会用极短期平均线,会解释价与量的表现,如是而已。其他就是看看市场指数,听听基本面消息凭感觉从事。

第三要,要有数学中学程度。知晓概率是短线交易的致胜因素。事实上,说中学程度的概率是好听而已,也许这小问题没念过算术的人也知道。一个有六面的骰子从1到6,三个偶数三个奇数,偶数出算赢,奇数出算输。长期掷骰,奇偶出的概率约各半。短线交易买后,涨或跌的情况。通常也是各半。那短线交易如何赢呢?让赢的时候赚一元,输的时候赔0.5元。100次中,赢50次,赚50元,输50次赔25元,最后总结赚25元。这是短线交易常在我心的唯一胜计,别无他方良策。所以进场后,方向对了让它去跑一下以达目的;方向不对立刻出场没有心理因素考虑去留的余地。

第四要,大形势不对,不管时间长短,绝不交易。形势对时,胜算会比前述50对50高出许多。形势不对如逆水行舟,高明的短线交易必为自己放长假,与势争绝无必要,且有可能引来平白伤亡。什么叫形势对与不对?九○年代的大牛市到2000年3月形势逆转,此时投资人尚无从得知大势不妙,到了10月后技术图50天平均线向下破到200天平均线之下,形成死亡交叉,此时投资人该全面退场,短线交易更不可为。这情况到了今年5月时完全改变,50天平均线又翻上200天平均线形成黄金交叉。此时短线交易者长达两年半的假期结束,又是好交易时节的到来。

第五要,短线交易不是天天交易。做极短线者叫日交易者,但并不能日日交易。如果您今天交易赚了900元不要期待明天再进场去再赚900元。短线交易的好处是好像自己做生意,可选择那天做那天不做。您不要选择联准会要宣布涨不涨利息那天去做短线,那天该是看戏的日子。短线交易完全靠心理、情绪、感觉。您必须确定您那一天心情愉快,能专心不受打扰地交易;同时,您要有今天市场将有波动而能赚钱的浓厚感觉。短线交易之事要把它当成一个生意来做,专研50支之内的股票,平常波动较大的个股,选到了黄道吉日,心想今天可以做,就开门去做。明年要去度假的费用,下星期想买个数位相机,这几天的买菜钱就可由短线赚取。想从短线交易明年搬入百万豪宅,就太异想天开了。

Friday, October 05, 2007

ER of the week
Teu. aa, mos
Thr.pep
aa,mos,pep

Monday, October 01, 2007

Oct call target update:
cmed 46
sina 51-53
tie 35.2, or higher
ice 160
ma 155-160, strong resistance at 155
gme support 52.5
calm ?

ach 95
chl 95
crox 70-72.5
cmi 145 (no at support, might add)
fwlt 155
amzn 95 (now at uptrendline, consider out!)
dsx 33
tra 35, support 29
jrcc 7.5
fcx 112.5(?)

Saturday, September 29, 2007

ER of the week
Mon: calm, palm, wag
Tue: mu
Thur: fdo, mar, mtrx, rimm

Thursday, September 27, 2007

calm: on top of uptrendline, target 25.5, ready to out
gme: support 52.5, most likely will head down to there, should be out when hit 60.
ice: in top of a minor up channel, strong resistance at 155 area, prepare to out oct call.
sina: berish, support 46, 44
tie: strong resistance at 34-35, if breakout next target 39
cmed: on 5th wave up as expected, target 44
ma: target 155

Tuesday, September 25, 2007

Portofolio: cbak,ach,sina,cmed,gdx,tie,calm,ma,ice

calm, breakout U/V, target 30-32, support 23, once reached target, exit calls.
cch, forming cup handle, target 88, support ?
cbak, just brokeout, target 5.2, 6.2, 8, support 5?
gme, trend up steeper, watch out for retrace, agile to exit 60 oct call
sina, cup-handle consolidating, target 58, support 47, overbot condition
cmed, in 4th wave, expect to enter 5th up wave, near term target 48
gdx, support 43, should out when breakdown
tie, resistance 35, target 38, support 32 should out when touched 35 on 9-24-07
ma, in minor up channel, found support at trendline 142, target 154-160, 175
ice, still bearish, target 160, downside support 142 ?

Thursday, September 20, 2007

about asti and dsti
ASCENT SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES

Ascent Solar (ASTI) has two warrants that trade under the symbols ASTIW and ASTIZ.

ASTIW - offers investors the right to purchase shares of ASTI at a strike price of $6.60 a share, and expire in early 2011. These warrants are callable above $9.36 a share, which means the company can call in the warrants and require investors to (i) sell the warrants in open market at market value, or (ii) exercise the warrants to purchase the common stock at a profit.

ASTIZ - offers investors the right to purchase shares of ASTI at a strike price of $11.00 a share, and expire in early 2011. These warrants are non-callable, and offer investors a means for a long term option to purchase shares of ASTI above $11.00 at a discount until 2011.

Wednesday, September 19, 2007

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

8-15-07 deadly sell-off




Tuesday, August 14, 2007

8-14-2007 sell off(slowly)